

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF CHILEAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS (1834-1924). FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION^{1*}

EL APRENDIZAJE DE LOS LÍDERES PARLAMENTARIOS CHILENOS (1834-1924)
DESDE LA PERSPECTIVA DE LA TEORÍA DE LA INSTITUCIONALIZACIÓN
LEGISLATIVA

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ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the historical development of Chilean congressional leadership offices (1834-1924), while testing a proposition of the theory of legislative institutionalization that says that legislatures gradually move toward greater boundedness over time. The indicator of boundedness is the length of the apprenticeship of congressional leaders. Lateral entry, short office tenure, and returning leaders became distinctive features in the case at hand. Institutional design and exchanges between the legislature and the environment determine legislative institutionalization, so a legislature institutionalizes by acquiring stability, permanence, distinctiveness, and sustainability in a polity.

Key words: Legislative institutionalization; boundedness; apprenticeship; legislature.

RESUMEN

Este artículo analiza el desarrollo histórico de las oficinas de liderazgo parlamentario chilenas (1834-1924) y somete a prueba una proposición de la teoría de institucionalización legislativa que dice que los congresos gradualmente aumentan su delimitación. El indicador de delimitación es la extensión del aprendizaje de los líderes parlamentarios. En el caso en estudio, entrada lateral, permanencias cortas y líderes retornados constituyeron características distintivas. Diseño institucional e intercambios entre el congreso

^{1*} Abreviaturas: SCD: Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados; SCS: Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores; Ord.: Sesión Ordinaria; Ext.: Sesión Extraordinaria; Reglamento (1831): 1831 Reglamento Interior de la Cámara de Diputados; Reglamento (1840): 1840 Reglamento del Senado; Reglamento (1846): 1846 Reglamento Interior de la Cámara de Diputados.

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y el ambiente determinan la institucionalización legislativa, por lo que un congreso se institucionaliza en virtud de su estabilidad, permanencia, unicidad y sustentabilidad.

Palabras clave: Institucionalización legislativa; delimitación; aprendizaje; congreso.

Introduction

Research on legislative origins explains the creation, permanence, and salience of legislatures. This is the goal of the theory of legislative institutionalization, which emerged out of a concern with congressional careers and the historical time of the American Congress in the late 1960s³.

This theory focuses on the process of legislative development from a historical perspective. It takes the whole legislature -or legislative institutions, as a unit of analysis, while conceiving it as an organization that moves toward growing stability, permanence, and distinctiveness by increasing boundedness, complexity, and autocracy, although subjected both to external and internal influences^{4 5}.

Legislative scholars have researched legislative institutionalization through intensive field work in several legislatures, e.g. national, supra-national, and sub-national. Besides harsh theoretical controversies, they have measured legislative institutionalization through several operational indicators that tap the dimensions involved therein. In so doing, their findings make possible to hypothesize about patterns of legislative development⁶.

³ Witmer, Richard, The Aging of the House /in/ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 79, 1964, pp. 526-541; Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968, pp. 144-145.

⁴ Collie, Melissa, Legislative Structure and its Effects, in Silbey, Joel H. (ed.), Encyclopedia of the American legislative system: studies of the principal structures, processes, and policies of Congress and the state legislatures since the colonial era, C. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1994, pp. 567-571; Polsby, Nelson, Studying Congress through Time: A Comment on Joseph Cooper and David Brady, 'Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress /in/ American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, no. 4., 1981, p. 1011; Hibbing, John, Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them /in/ Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, pp. 156-157.

⁵ Sociological institutionalism accepted reversals of institutionalization due to internal causes. Peters, B. Guy, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism', Pinter, London, 1999, pp. 99-100.

⁶ Cf. Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968; Polsby, Nelson, Gallagher, Miriam, and Rundquist, Barry Spencer, The Growth of the Seniority System in the U. S. House of Representatives /in/ American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, no. 3, 1969; Chaffey, Douglas, The Institutionalization of State

The Chilean legislature, on the other hand, has been around for more than a one-and-a-half century, despite some interruptions (e.g., 1838, 1924-1925, 1932, 1973-1989). The reemergence of this legislature attests the meaningful role it plays in the Chilean polity. Indeed, this role did not go unnoticed for an early visitor to the country, Paul S. Reinsch, who critically underscored the vitality of the early Chilean legislature (1834-1924), as follows: *"The public life of Chile offers a most fascinating field to the student of political science, because here he will encounter conditions of society and political action not unlike of those of the most interesting periods of political history ... With the England of the eighteenth century Chile has much in common. Here, too, an aristocracy of birth and wealth has unquestioned control of social and political life. ... The Chilean (SIC) parliament is the council of a governing class where men who, with all their differences of opinion, respect each other, meet and discuss their common interests with dignity and ability. Here it is possible for the investigator to observe a community engaged in almost purely political controversy, a community in which political discussion always hold the center of the stage. ... The very first impression of which the study of Chilean (SIC) political history conveys is that of the stability of Chilean (SIC) society"*⁷.

Interestingly enough, congressional institutions –both structures and routines, re-emerged without departing sharply from previous times, as inferred from both houses' standing orders and some observations about the Chilean legislature⁸. The latter strongly suggests that the Chilean legislature gradually institutionalized by achieving stability, permanence, and distinctiveness among Chile's political institutions –especially by the early twentieth century⁹, which advises focusing on those early years in which Chilean congressional institutions acquired their features, as they hold the key to understand their historical development.

Legislatures: A Comparative Study /in/ The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 23, no. 1, 1970; Cooper, Joseph and Brady, David, Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, no. 4, 1981; Hibbing, John, Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons /in/ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, no. 3, 1988; Hibbing, John and Patterson, Samuel, The Emergence of Democratic Parliaments in Eastern and Central Europe in Copeland, Gary and Patterson, Samuel (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994; Judge, David, Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Arrow? /in/ Government and Opposition, Vol. 38, no. 4, 2003.

⁷ Reinsch, Paul, Parliamentary Government in Chile /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 3, no. 4, 1909, pp. 507-510.

⁸ Stokes, William, Parliamentary Government in Latin America /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 39, no. 3, 1945, pp. 526-527; Gil, Federic, The Political System of Chile, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966, pp. 117-119; Valenzuela, Arturo and Wilde, Alexander, Presidential Politics and the Decline of the Chilean Congress, in Smith, Joel and Musolf, Lloyd (eds.), Legislatures and Political Development, Duke University Press, Durham, 1979, pp. 192-195

⁹ Obando Camino, Iván Mauricio, Legislative Institutionalization in Chile, 1834-1924, unpublished manuscript, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, 2009, p. 405.

Focusing on the apprenticeship of congressional leaders of the early Chilean legislature (1834-1924), i.e. both houses' Presidents and Vice-Presidents, from the vantage point of the theory of legislative institutionalization, provides an opportunity to find out about the historical development of Chilean congressional leadership offices in a milieu characterized both by internal and external influences, e.g. institutional design and growing impact of partisanship, precisely at a time in which most Chilean congressional institutions acquired their long-term features. Likewise, it makes possible to test a key proposition of this theory that takes aim at differentiating the legislature from its environment. i.e., legislatures move toward greater boundedness by hardening their external boundaries, as evinced by the emergence of career opportunities available to Congress members only. On this vein, the length of the apprenticeship of congressional leaders is a classical, operational indicator of boundedness drawn from Polsby's "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives", published in 1968, which assumes that congressional leadership offices are unavailable to members lacking some congressional experience, so recruitment to these offices takes place from within the legislature -as opposed to lateral entries from without¹⁰. Summing up, this research pursues to find out about the historical development of Chilean congressional leadership offices, while contributing to theory-building by testing that proposition in a non-traditional legislature at the same time.

This article describes a pattern of historical development of Chilean congressional leadership offices, according to which lawmakers conceived them as majority-controlled offices both inserted in a decentralized power structure and subjected to external influences that made their way through their institutional design. Lateral entry, short office tenure, and returning leaders became conspicuous features of these offices; however, liberalization of the autocratic, Conservative Republic had a diverse impact on both houses' leadership offices by rising to mild prominence the House Presidency, while decreasing the prominence of the Senate Presidency, even though it did not change their main features in the long-run.

By the same token, it shows that the aforementioned proposition receives mixed support from the evidence analyzed herein. The latter implies that legislative institutionalization takes different configurations depending on the institutional design and the exchanges between the legislature and the environment (especially the party system), all of which determine an upper limit for the institutionalization of a legislature¹¹. Therefore, the characteristics, and operational indicators to measure legislative institutionalization vary in different polities and legislatures, which do not impair the

¹⁰ Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968, pp. 146, 148.

¹¹ Hibbing, John, Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them /in/ Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, p. 161.

grounds to consider a legislature as institutionalized, as long as it acquires stability, permanence, distinctiveness, and sustainability in a polity.

This article consists of five sections, including this Introduction and Conclusions. It reviews the theoretical issues of the theory of legislative institutionalization at first. It focuses on the constitutional framework of the early Chilean legislature and the structural aspects of the congressional leadership offices thereafter. Finally, it analyzes the length of apprenticeship of both houses' congressional leaders.

The theory of legislative institutionalization

Sociological institutionalism provided the background for the theory of legislative institutionalization, as leading scholars developed an interest in the role of institutions and the process of institution-formation, e.g. Parsons, Selznick, and Eisenstadt.

Eisenstadt defined institutionalization as *"a process of continuous crystallization of different types of norms, organizations, and frameworks which regulate the processes of exchange of different commodities"*¹². This definition implied both continuity and change in social norms and structures, because institutionalization meant establishing effective system boundaries, which made room for challenging groups¹³.

Legislative scholars did not pay heed to this inference, though. They suggested instead that legislative institutionalization implied stability and permanence of legislative structures through process-oriented definitions. Thus, Loewenberg and Patterson defined it as *"the process by which legislatures acquire a definite way of performing their functions that set them apart"*¹⁴. Hibbing defined it as *"the process by which a body acquires a definite way of performing its functions – a way that sets it apart from its environment and that is independent of the membership and issues of the moment"*¹⁵. On the contrary, Sisson made room for change by defining it as *"the existence and persistence of valued rules, procedures, and patterns of behavior"*

¹² Eisenstadt, Shmuel, Social Institutions, in Sills, David (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 14, The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 414.

¹³ Eisenstadt, S. N. Institutionalization and Change /in/ American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, no. 2, 1964, pp. 235-236, 245-247; Peters, Guy, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism', Pinter, London, 1999, pp. 99-100. On this vein, Eisenstadt maintained that: "Such institutionalization is, of course, not random or purely accidental; but neither is it fixed or unchanging" (Eisenstadt, Shmuel, Social Institutions, in Sills, David (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 14, The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 414-415).

¹⁴ Loewenberg, Gerhard and Patterson, Samuel, Comparing Legislatures: An Analytic Study, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1979, p. 21.

¹⁵ Hibbing, John, Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons /in/ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, no. 3, 1988, p. 682.

*which enable the accommodation of new configurations of political claimants and/or demands within a given organization*¹⁶.

Regarding institutionalization and change, Jepperson held later that institutionalization is the process by which a social order or pattern attains a self-reproductive nature, which persistence depends upon internal, routine-like procedures; in other words, institutionalization is a property of a social order, which counters departures from routinized forms, although it does not ensure its survival¹⁷. The end-result is a process-oriented view of legislative institutionalization that allows legislative structures and routines gradually achieve stability, permanence, distinctiveness, and sustainability in a polity; namely, legislative institutionalization deals with process instead of outcome¹⁸.

Political science took stock of sociological institutionalism through comparative politics at first. Huntington's "Political Development and Political Decay", published in 1965, defined institutions as "*stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior*" and institutionalization as "*the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability*"¹⁹. Huntington maintained that institutionalization strengthened both organizations and procedures, and characterized them by their adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. The latter enabled an organization to set itself apart from the environment by establishing boundaries, defining folkways, setting up internal procedures, and mediating inter-system exchanges according to an agreed-upon view. Nevertheless, Huntington did not provide standards to identify and measure these criteria²⁰.

Drawing from Huntington, Polsby's "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives" applied institutionalization theory to the House of Representatives. Polsby defined neither institution nor institutionalization; instead, he focused on patterns of legislative behavior that characterized an institutionalized legislature, as follows: 1. It distinguishes itself to a high degree from the environment, that is, boundedness. 2. It exhibits a division and interaction of specialized functions that makes it

¹⁶ Sisson, Richard, Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Exploration in Kornberg, Allan (ed.), Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, David McKay Company, Inc., New York, 1974, p. 24.

¹⁷ Jepperson, Ronald, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism in Powell, Walter and DiMaggio, Paul (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, pp. 145-149.

¹⁸ Peters, Guy, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism', Pinter, London, 1999, p. 85.

¹⁹ Huntington, Samuel, Political Development and Political Decay /in/ World Politics, Vol. 17, no. 3, 1965, p. 394.

²⁰ Ibid, pp. 393-394, 411.

relatively complex, that is, internal complexity. 3. It relies on universalistic and automated decision-making to perform legislative functions, that is, autocracy²¹.

Polsby measured boundedness through indicators that dealt with careers opportunities in the House. Indeed, he measured the specialization of the congressional leadership through the length of the apprenticeship required to rise to these offices. The rationale for this indicator was that sudden emergence and rise of lawmakers to congressional leadership offices -even from without, characterizes undifferentiated, deinstitutionalized legislatures, while the reverse is true for differentiated, institutionalized legislatures. As a matter of fact, Polsby maintained: *"As an organization institutionalizes ... Its leadership professionalizes and persists. Recruitment to leadership is more likely to occur from within, and the apprenticeship lengthens. Thus the organization establishes and hardens its 'outer' boundaries"*²².

The evidence persuaded Polsby that the House exhibited a trend toward greater institutionalization characterized by a convergence of most indicators from 1890 through 1910, which he called the "big-bang" period²³.

Needless to say, students of American legislatures contested Polsby's characteristics and indicators of an institutionalized House. These criticisms dealt with the measurement of boundedness, the link between professionalization and institutionalization, and the extent of the directionality and change implied in the institutionalization process²⁴. However, several of these criticisms seemed to have either supplemented the theory or brought about a more attentive focus on some aspects of legislatures in retrospective²⁵.

²¹ Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968, pp. 145, 168; Polsby, Nelson, "Legislatures", in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 5, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 1975, p. 289.

²² Polsby, Nelson, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, 1968, pp. 145-146.

²³ Polsby's conclusions received additional weight from a follow-up study on the growth of seniority in the House (Polsby, Nelson, Gallagher, Miriam, and Rundquist, Barry Spencer, The Growth of the Seniority System in the U. S. House of Representatives /in/ American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, no. 3, 1969, p. 807).

²⁴ Dometrius, Nelson and Sigelman, Lee, Costs, Benefits, and Careers in the U.S. House of Representatives: A Developmental Approach /in/ Congress and the Presidency, Vol. 18, no. 1, 1991, p. 63; Fiorina, Morris, Rohde, David, and Wissel, Peter, Historical Change in House Turnover, in Ornstein, Norman (ed.), Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975, pp. 27-29; Chaffey, Douglas, The Institutionalization of State Legislatures: A Comparative Study /in/ The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 23, no. 1, 1970, pp. 182-193; Cooper, Joseph and Brady, David, Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress /in/ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, no. 4, 1981, p. 998; Hibbing, John R., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them /in/ Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, pp. 160-162.

²⁵ Obando Camino, Iván Mauricio, Legislative Institutionalization in Chile, 1834-1924, unpublished manuscript, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, 2009, pp. 40-41.

Interestingly enough, students of legislatures from Western Europe and non-traditional settings came across with overlooked variables, especially institutional design and party systems. On this score, Hibbing maintained that legislative institutionalization assumes an organizational movement in a specific direction, whose strength varies according to the type of legislature²⁶. Hibbing claimed that: *"Just as some legislatures cannot institutionalize as much as others, legislatures ... cannot institutionalize as much as more common hierarchical forms"*²⁷.

The early Chilean legislature (1834-1924) and the congressional leadership offices

a) The constitutional framework of the early Chilean legislature (1834-1924)

The autocratic Constitution of 1833 presided over the period analyzed here. This constitution kept the bicameral legislature created by the 1828 Constitution. It did not only bequeath a functioning legislature endowed with legislative, taxing, and budgetary authority, but it also provided a constitutional framework for uninterrupted, aristocratic civilian government in Chile, which evolved from an autocratic, aristocratic polity to a competitive proto-democracy in a ninety-year time span.

The first three presidents elected after 1831 remained in office for a decade. They inaugurated the autocratic, Conservative Republic that consolidated the nation-state and government viability. A new Liberal Republic developed from 1861 to 1891, wherein prohibition of presidential reelection in 1871, emergence of modern political parties, and congressional policy-making became major staples of this regime. Congressional victory over the presidency in the 1891 Civil War inaugurated the Parliamentary Republic. From 1891 to 1925 Congress shifted the policy-making authority to the legislature, while political parties took electoral authority away from the presidency once electoral liberty became ingrained in the Chilean polity.

Throughout this period Congress shared in legislative initiative with the President of the Republic, but the latter could restrain the former through extraordinary prerogatives that turn him into a republican dictator²⁸. However, the Grand Convention made sure that the President of the Republic ruled with the advice of Congress by making

²⁶ Hibbing, John, Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them /in/ Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, pp. 160-162.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 161.

²⁸ Galdames, Luis, Historia de Chile: La Evolución Constitucional, Vol. I. Balcells & Co, Santiago, 1925, p. 939; Gil, Federico G., The Political System of Chile, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966, pp. 117-119.

mandatory the annual approval of the investment of public funds, the budget law, the authorization of the permanent ground and naval forces, the authorization to station permanent troops where Congress was in session and up to two-and-a-half miles, and the authorization to impose or suppress taxes every eighteen months. Likewise, Congress could impeach cabinet members, generals, admirals, high executive appointees, and members of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, in case of constitutional or legal transgressions, embezzlement, treason, extortion, and other ethical wrongdoings.

b) The President and Vice-President of the each house

Both houses had a leadership that consisted of a President and a Vice-President elected by absolute majority. They were re-eligible by the same quorum, though the standing orders required a supermajority of two-thirds for their re-election before 1840²⁹.

To insure a smooth functioning of the House, the House floor created a Second Vice-Presidency in June 1874, after the length of sessions affected the attendance of congressional leaders³⁰.

Although both houses' standing orders conveyed the idea that they were resourceful congressional leaders, they were political actors that played their part in the legislative process among several congressional power wielders, which begot a decentralized power structure that constrained them as elected officers³¹. Indeed, congressional journals suggest that lawmakers ended up conceiving of the House Presidency as a majority-controlled office, with which the incumbent joined ranks at critical junctures, e.g. House President Montt's cloture of the debate of the budget in 1885³².

The term of congressional leaders lasted one month. Later, the contentiousness of parliamentary politics turned these monthly contests into votes of no-confidence about the incumbent government³³. The House passed a reform to elect leaders at the inauguration of the ordinary or extraordinary sessions in 1904, as government stabi-

²⁹ Reglamento (1831): Articles 15, 18; Reglamento (1840): Articles 7, 8; Reglamento (1846): Articles 22, 23; SCS 13 Ord. (7/13/1846): 125-126, 127.

³⁰ Extended sessions impacted on the attendance of leaders. SCD 3 Ord. (6/9/1874): 37; SCD 4 Ord. (6/11/1874): 51; SCD 12 Ord. (6/30/1874): 162.

³¹ Engber Alvarez, Víctor, *Los Presidentes de las Cámaras*, Universidad de Chile, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1967, p. 102.

³² Deputy Palma held that the House President had to be an impartial judge. SCD 13 Ord. (7/13/1846): 126. On the role of House President Montt in 1885, see Encina, 1970: 1,630-1,631.

³³ Deputy Palacios recognized it when he proposed to extend the term of House leaders in early 1895. SCD 49 Ext. (1/18/1895): 854.

lity advised to extend the term of leaders. The Senate followed suit in 1917³⁴. These reforms allegedly strengthened the authority of congressional leaders by giving them more independence and opportunities to demonstrate "*conditions of impartial justice without which there can not be useful work in performing this high position*"³⁵.

c) The restricted role of the Presidency of each house

Presidential authority extended to all businesses required to keep a workable legislature, although under several floor restrictions. Indeed, the only exclusive decision of a President was setting the agenda of secret sessions. Besides, neither Presidency mattered in the ladder of constitutional offices. Nevertheless, each President participated in the legislative process like any other member, conversely to the British Speaker³⁶.

The burden of the office drove several Presidents to tender their resignations during the nineteenth century, but both houses rejected them most of the time due to a lack of alternative³⁷. Indeed, it is a moot point if a good office record mattered for a nomination to the Executive Office, since several Presidents of the Republic held a Presidency in the past.

The Presidency and the Vice-Presidency gave their holders a seat in both houses' Committee on Internal Police, which dealt with the congressional staff and internal affairs; however, their influence diminished later when the growth of the membership brought about an expansion of this committee membership. These offices also gave their holders a seat in the Committee on the Order of Legislative Business, though they did not constitute a majority.

A couple of electoral reforms passed in the early twentieth century provided incentives to hold a Presidency. In 1906 Congress mandated that one of the members of the Reviewing Committee of Electoral Mandates of Deputies is either an incumbent or a former Senate President or Vice-President. In 1914 Congress mandated that two of the members of the Reviewing Committee of Electoral Mandates of Senators and

³⁴ Sánchez, Néstor, *El Derecho Escrito y las Prácticas: Estudio sobre el Reglamento Interno de la Cámara de Diputados*, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911, pp. 99-100; Valdés Valdés, Ismael, *Las Prácticas Parlamentarias: Cámara de Diputados i Senado*, Sociedad Imprenta-Litografía Barcelona, Santiago, 2nd ed., 1918, pp. 56-57, 205-207, 221-222.

³⁵ Valdés Valdés, Ismael, *Las Prácticas Parlamentarias: Cámara de Diputados i Senado*, Sociedad Imprenta-Litografía Barcelona, Santiago, 2nd ed., 1918, p. 57. Deputy Vallejos filed the first complaint about an arbitrary enforcement of the House Standing Orders on June 13th, 1849. SCD 7 Ord. (6/13/1849): 39.

³⁶ Subsequent reforms did not change the restricted role of the office. Reglamento (1846), version of 1904: Articles 25-30, 97; Reglamento (1840), version of 1921: Articles 11-14, 89.

³⁷ Senate President Barros Luco unsuccessfully advised his fellow senators not to elect him to the Senate Presidency. SCS 65 Ext. (4/27/1896): 631.

Deputies be either an incumbent or a former President or Vice-President of different houses. Nevertheless, these reforms did not require congressional leaders to spend a minimal time in office before being appointed to these committees.

The apprenticeship of Chilean congressional leaders, 1834-1924

a) Length of the apprenticeship of House leaders

Tables 1, 2, and 3 provide data on the length of apprenticeship of House Presidents and Vice-Presidents. Considering that some members exited and returned to the House at different periods, these tables factor in previous congressional service through the sign plus (“+”), e.g. the House President García-Huidobro in 1842.

Table 1 shows an enormous disparity regarding previous congressional service among House Presidents, so a long apprenticeship was not a requisite to rise to this office (See Table 1). The restricted role of the office may explain this disparity. Likewise, this table shows that a same person could rise more than once to the office. Moreover, this table shows that there were nine House Presidents that lacked an immediate record of previous congressional service after 1833 (1840: Montt; 1843: Pinto; 1849: Lira; 1852: Urmeneta; 1858: Valenzuela; 1864: Tocornal Grez; 1897: Tocornal Tocornal; 1900: Toro; 1906: Orrego González), although three of them had it in the past (1864: Tocornal Grez; 1897: Tocornal Tocornal; 1906: Orrego Gonzalez). Furthermore, there were five House Presidents who spent less than a year in Congress before being elected to the office (1842: Cobo; 1886: Valdés Carrera; 1901: Pinto Izaarra; 1909: Bascuñán; 1912: Sánchez). Interestingly enough, this phenomenon diminished in the Liberal Republic (1864: Tocornal Grez; 1886: Valdés Carrera).

Nevertheless, a minimal congressional service might have been necessary to master the ins-and-outs of legislative work. This proposition requires finding out whether or not any type of apprenticeship developed eventually, for which purpose it is advisable averaging the data of Table 1 by distinguishing the Conservative Republic (1833-1861), Liberal Republic (1861-1891), and Parliamentary Republic (1891-1924). This exercise provides the following results:

	APPOINTMENTS	AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1833-1861	26	4,6
1861-1891	27	9,0
1891-1924	43	7,8

These figures show that the average apprenticeship of House Presidents went up from four years and six months to nine years after 1860. Although it declined to seven years and eight months after 1891, it was still higher than before 1860. The latter shows that a mild apprenticeship went hand-in-hand with the liberalization of the Conservative Republic after 1861.

According to Tables 2 and 3, a long apprenticeship was not a requisite to rise to the First House Vice-Presidency or Second House Vice-Presidency (See Tables 2 and 3). However, there was a mild apprenticeship to rise to any of these offices, which is apparent after averaging the data of both tables by the aforementioned periods of political history. Thus, the results for First House Vice-Presidency are, as follows:

	APPOINTMENTS	AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1831-1861	33	3,9
1861-1891	32	5,9
1891-1924	51	4,6

The results for the Second House Vice-Presidency are, as follows:

	APPOINTMENTS	AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1831-1861	0	0
1861-1891	16	4,0
1891-1924	56	3,5

Although the Second House Vice-Presidency was created in 1874, the average apprenticeship required for the House Presidency was always the largest after the same period of political history is compared across offices. Moreover, the length of this apprenticeship for both the House Presidency and the First House Vice-Presidency increased during the Liberal Republic and decreased during the Parliamentary Republic, though it still remained higher than before 1861. Moreover, the average apprenticeship required for the First House Vice-Presidency was larger than the one required for the Second House Vice-Presidency, after the same period of political history is compared between both offices. Needless to say, the different length of average apprenticeship allows inferring the existence of a ranking order among the House leadership offices.

However, the reduction of this apprenticeship and the exceedingly high number of appointments to each office after 1891 is puzzling. Besides the scarce incentives provided by these offices, it might have had something to do with the unstable coalitional politics that characterized the Parliamentary Republic, which influenced elections to these offices too. After all, elections to congressional leadership offices reflec-

ted congressional support for the government³⁸. Unsurprisingly, Rivas commented on the election to the House leadership offices in 1909, as follows: *"The radicals asked this time the House Presidency for one of them, [they] are the more numerous group; they want it for an old and good fighter, Don Francisco de Paula Pleiteado, an honest man who never has had honours. The parties granted it upon him. There was [a need] to grant upon the democrats, in the person of Malaquías Concha, a vice-presidency to represent the union with them in the board*³⁹".

In the end, party considerations, plus mild congressional experience, determined who rose to the House Presidency and Vice-Presidencies, albeit the restricted role of these offices might have deterred the most ambitious or experienced members.

³⁸ Edwards Vives, Alberto, Bosquejo Histórico de los Partidos Políticos Chilenos in Edwards Vives, Alberto and Frei Montalva, Eduardo, Historia de los Partidos Políticos Chilenos, Editorial del Pacífico S.A., Santiago, 1949, p. 134.

³⁹ Rivas Vicuña, Ramón, Historia Política y Parlamentaria de Chile, Vol. 1, Ediciones de la Biblioteca Nacional, Santiago, 1964, p. 119.

Table 1. House President's previous congressional service

YEAR	PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	PRESIDENT	SERVICE
1834	Fuenzalida	0	1864	Tocornal G.	0+12,0	1895	Videla	3,9	1920	Ruiz	5,6
1835	Izquierdo	1,4	1867	Vargas F.	3,0+3,0	1897	Tocornal T.	0+3,0+3,0	1921	Ruiz	6,0
1836	Martínez	2,1		Amunátegui	3,4	1898	Montt M.	19,1	1922	Rivas	4,0
	Izquierdo	2,2	1868	Vargas F.	5,6	1899	Tocornal T.	2,0	1923	Medina	7,0
1837	Izquierdo	3,1	1870	Errázuriz V.	3,0+3,0		Montt M.	20,4		Celis	5,1
1839	Mena	2,0	1871	Amunátegui	7,0	1900	Toro	0		Salas	2,7
	Izquierdo	5,2	1872	Prats	2,0		Palacios	6,1	1924	Durán	2,11
1840	Montt	0	1873	Prats	3,0	1901	Pinto I.	0,10		Mac-Iver	6,0
	Yrarrázaval	6,1	1876	Matta	12,0+6,0	1902	Videla	10,11		Silva	9,0
1841	Tocornal J.	7,0		Concha T.	12,4		Concha B.	2,5+3,0			
	Eyzaguirre	1,1	1879	Amunátegui	16,0	1903	Concha B.	3,0+3,0			
1842	Cobo	0,1		García H.	3,3		Bello	9,3			
	Pérez	6,2	1880	Amunátegui	17,1	1904	Valdés V.	16,0			
	García-Huidobro	2,4+3,0	1881	García H.	5,5	1905	Concha S.	1,4+9,0			
	Vidal	8,6	1882	Huneus	9,0	1906	Orrego G.	0+3,0			
1843	Pinto	0	1885	Lastarria	9,0	1907	Gutiérrez	1,0+3,0			
1845	Yrarrázaval	10,8		Zañartu	3,3		Orrego G.	1,4+3,0			
1846	Vidal	12,0		Montt M.	6,6	1909	Pleiteado	3,0+9,0			
	Montt T.	6,4	1886	Freire	1,6		Bascuñán	0,5+4,6+3,0			
1849	Lira	0		Orrego L.	4,6	1911	Armanet	2,2			
1850	Pérez	14,2	1888	Barros L.	21,0	1912	Rodríguez	5,10			
1852	Urmeneta	0		Valdés C.	0,6		Sánchez	0,9			
1855	Urmeneta	3,0	1889	Lastarria	15,0		Balmaceda S.	3,0			
1857	Gana	17,4		Barros L.	22,1	1915	Balmaceda S.	6,0			
1858	Valenzuela	0	1891	Barros L.	24,5	1916	Viel	10,0			
1859	Ovalle	7,0	1892	Matte	12,7	1917	Fernández	10,0			
1861	Silva Algue	9,0		Barros L.	25,0	1918	Rosselot	12,0			
1862	Varas	10,0+6,0		Zegers	16,1		Briones	3,5			
1863	Urmeneta	9,5	1894	Valdés V.	6,0	1920	Edwards M.	2,5			

Source: Author's creation from Valencia Avaria, Luis (comp.), *Anales de la República*, Vol. II.

Table 2. First House Vice-President's previous congressional service

YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE
1834	Iñiguez	0	1852	García	9,0	1885	Castellón	3,0+3,0	1905	Pinto A.	8,4
1835	Ariarán	1,4	1855	Ochagavía	3,0		Yávar	9,6		Figuerola	5,4
1836	Martínez	2,1	1858	Barriga	3,0	1886	Errázuriz E., L.	1,6	1906	Concha S.	0
	Eyzaguirre A., Dgo.	2,1	1859	Eguiguren	7,0+3,0		Vidal	1,6+3,0+6,0	1907	Puga	3,0
	Astorga	2,2	1861	Alcalde	6,0	1888	Riesco	0		Besa N., A.	4,4
1837	Frutos	0,1		Varas R.	1,4	1889	Errázuriz E., Luis	1,0	1908	Sánchez	2,5
1839	Pérez	3,0	1862	Huidobro	0		Pinochet	4,5	1909	Rodríguez H.	3,0
	Eyzaguirre A., Dgo.	5,2	1863	Silva A.	11,5	1891	Blanco	6,5+6,0		Gallardo	0,4+6,0
1840	Eyzaguirre A., José	0	1864	Santa María	0+3,0	1892	Arlegui	0,2	1912	Rossetot	5,7
	Yrarázaval	5,10	1867	Amunátegui	3,0		Bannen	4,0		Pinto C.	2,3
	Eyzaguirre A., José	0,2		Opaso	0,4		Rodríguez R.	1,1		Puga	0+6,0
	Pérez	4,6	1869	González	5,4+3,0	1893	Arlegui	1,6	1914	Álamos	2,6
	Cobo	0,1	1870	González	6,1	1894	Besa N., C.	6,0	1915	Álamos	3,0
	Iñiguez	8,1		Concha T.	6,3	1895	Yáñez	1,2	1918	Bermúdez	9,0
	Vidal	8,4	1872	Ossa	8,0+3,0	1897	Valdés C.	9,0		Jaramillo	3,5
	Reyes	8,6	1873	Ossa	9,0+3,0		Herboso	3,7	1919	Errázuriz L.	1,0
1843	Vidal	9,0		Blest	6,4	1898	Matte	7,2		Errázuriz T.	4,3
1844	Bustamante	1,0	1874	Blest	7,1	1899	Herboso	5,0		Valdés E.	1,4
	Lastra	1,5	1876	Concha T.	12,0		Jordán	7,8+12,0		Blanlot	1,5
1846	Zenteno	0		Rodríguez B.	6,4		Matte	7,11	1920	Cubillos	5,0
	Lazcano M.	3,3		García H.	0,3+3,0		Del Río	2,5		Arellano	2,0
	Pérez	10,4	1877	Cood	13,5	1900	Barros M.	0+3,0		Urzúa	8,5
1847	Varas	4,0	1878	Allende	1,11		Covarrubias	0,1		Vargas	3,6
1848	Pérez	12,2	1879	Arteaga	0+3,0	1901	Concha B.	0,10+3,0	1921	Correa R.	3,0
1849	Eyzaguirre P.	0		García H.	3,0	1902	Edwards M.	2,5	1922	Silva	4,0+3,0
1850	Solar	1,0		Lastarria	3,3	1903	Covarrubias	3,0	1923	Ramírez	5,0
	Eyzaguirre P.	1,1	1880	Mac-Iver	4,6	1904	Pleiteado	1,0+9,0		Garces	2,2
	Solar	1,2	1882	Barros L.	15,0		Corbalán	1,2+3,0	1924	Corréa R.	5,11
1851	García	8,0	1884	Lastarria	8,0	1905	Pleiteado	2,0+9,0	1924	Arancibia	3,0

Source: Author's creation from Valencia Avaria, Luis (comp.), *Anales de la República*, Vol. II.

Table 3. Second House Vice-President's previous congressional service

YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE
1874	Matta	4,1	1900	Lazcano	6,0	1918	Cárdenas	6,0
1875	Lindsay	2,0		Sanfuentes, V.	6,1		Gutiérrez	0+9,0
1876	García H.	0+3,0	1901	Rivera	3,10	1920	Reyes	2,5
	Allende	0,5	1902	Bascuñán	0,5		Robinson	1,5
1878	Beauchef	10,11		Espinosa	2,5	1921	Paredes	1,11
1879	Beauchef	12,0	1903	Errázuriz E.	0		Balmaceda T.	3,4
1882	Dávila	3,0		Puga	0,5		Paredes	2,4
1885	Yávar	9,0	1904	Pinto A.	7,0	1922	Cardenas	9,11
	Bernales	3,6	1905	Puga	2,4		Correa R.	1,4
1886	Villamil	4,6	1906	Rodríguez H.	3,0	1923	Vargas	2,0
	Vargas	4,6		Echavarría	0,4		O'Ryan	5,0
1887	Santa María, I.	2,0	1907	Villegas	7,0		Navarrete	2,1
1888	Bañados	3,0		Sanfuentes, A.	1,4		Adrian	5,4
	Errázuriz E., Luis	0,6		Sánchez	1,5	1924	De la Vega	2,9
1889	Vial	1,0	1908	Baquadano	2,6	1924	Barbosa	0+6,0
1890	Grez	1,7	1909	Concha O.	9,0			
1891	Bannen	3,5+3,0		Luco	0,4			
1892	Besa	4,0	1911	Saavedra	1,7			
	Barrios	4,6		Alarcón	2,2			
1894	Yáñez	0	1912	Pinto Cruz	2,0			
1895	Fisher	1,2		Quezada	2,8			
1897	Palacios	3,0		Morandé	2,10			
	Herboso	3,3		Larraín	0			
	Matte	6,2		García	3,2			
1898	Rivera	1,7	1913	Riesco	1,5			
1899	Jordán	7,7	1914	Costa	2,0			
	Herquínigo	5,1		Mena	2,6			
	Del Río	2,4	1915	Mena	3,0			
	Ovalle	2,5	1916	Vidal	3,0+6,0			

Source: Author's creation from Valencia Avaria, Luis (comp.), *Anales de la República*, Vol. II.

a) Length of the apprenticeship of Senate leaders

Tables 4 and 5 provide data on the length of apprenticeship of Senate Presidents and Vice-Presidents. Considering that some members exited and returned to the Senate at different periods, these tables factor in previous congressional service through the sign plus (“+”), e.g. the Senate President Pérez in 1873.

Tables 4 and 5 also show an enormous disparity regarding previous congressional service and that a same person could rise to office more than once (See Tables 4 and 5).

Regarding the Senate Presidency, Table 4 shows that Senate Presidents with short previous congressional service were in shorter supply than in the House. Thus, there were five Senate Presidents who did not have an immediate record of congressional service (1837: Del Solar; 1867: Tocornal Grez; 1873: Pérez; 1888: Santa María; 1895: Reyes Palazuelos), though two of them had it in the past (1873: Pérez; 1895: Reyes Palazuelos), including a former President of the Republic (1873: Pérez). Likewise, there was one Senate President who did not have previous Senate service, notwithstanding he was a former President of the Republic (Domingo Santa María). By the same token, there were two Senate Presidents who spent less than a year in Congress before being elected to the office (1834: Elizondo; 1852: Lazcano Mujica). However, most of these instances split evenly between the Conservative Republic (1834: Elizondo; 1837: Del Solar; 1852: Lazcano Mujica) and the Liberal Republic (1867: Tocornal Grez; 1873: Pérez; 1888: Santa María), whereas there is only one instance during the Parliamentary Republic (1895: Reyes Palazuelos).

Averaging the data of Tables 4 and 5 by the aforementioned periods of political history shed light on the apprenticeship required for the Senate Presidency and the Senate Vice-Presidency. Thus, the results for the Senate Presidency are, as follows:

	APPOINTMENTS	AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1831-1861	26	8,2
1861-1891	19	7,2
1891-1924	26	7,1

The results for the Senate Vice-Presidency are, as follows:

	APPOINTMENTS	AVERAGE PREVIOUS SERVICE
1831-1861	23	5,7
1861-1891	26	5,0
1891-1924	29	5,6

These results show that the length of the average apprenticeship evolved differently for both offices, even with respect to the House's. The longest average apprenticeship for both offices occurred during the Conservative Republic. The average apprenticeship required for the Senate Presidency decreased constantly over time and resembled the House's by the Parliamentary Republic. This might have had something to do with electoral reforms in Senate elections that went into effect in 1876, as part of the liberalization of the autocratic, Conservative Republic. The average apprenticeship for the Senate Vice-Presidency remained relatively stable in app. five years and four months, although it increased without a clear-cut explanation during the Parliamentary Republic. These findings also allow inferring the existence of a ranking order between both offices insofar as the average apprenticeship for the Senate Presidency was longer than for the Senate Vice-Presidency.

Table 4. Senate President's previous congressional service

YEAR	PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	PRESIDENT	SERVICE
1834	Benavente	0	1867	Tocornal G.	0	1909	Valdés V.	3,5
	Elizondo	0,4		Correa	27,1		Vergara R.	2,0
1835	Tocornal J.	1,1	1868	Covarrubias	1,6	1911	Matte	11,2
1837	Elizondo	2,7	1870	Covarrubias	3,0	1912	Matte	12,0
1837	Del Solar	0	1873	Pérez	0+9,0	1913	Aldunate	4,4
1839	Vial del Río	5,0	1875	Covarrubias	9,0	1914	Ochagavía	2,4
1840	Tocornal J.	6,0	1879	Covarrubias	12,0	1915	Charme	12,0
1841	Yrarrázaval	4,0	1881	Varas	5,1	1918	Tocornal T.	3,0
1843	Yrarrázaval	6,0	1882	Varas	6,0	1919	Lazcano E.	25,3
	Vial del Río	9,2	1885	Varas	9,0	1920	Tocornal T.	5,3
	Yrarrázaval	6,3	1886	Cuadra	4,1		Claro	8,4
	Vial del Río	9,5	1887	Antúnez	2,1	1921	Claro	9,0
1844	Egaña	10,1		Vergara U.	5,4	1924	Yáñez	12,0
	Benavente	10,3	1888	Santa María	0			
1846	Benavente	12,0		Valderrama	3,5			
1847	Yrarrázaval	10,0	1889	Reyes P.	1,0			
	Pinto	1,1	1891	Silva A.	3,6			
	Yrarrázaval	10,2	1892	Gandarillas	1,0			
	Pinto	1,3	1893	Edwards R.	4,7			
1849	Benavente	15,0	1894	Edwards R.	5,0			
1852	Benavente	18,0	1895	Reyes P.	0+3,0			
	Lazcano Mujica	0,2	1896	Barros L.	3,7			
1855	Benavente	21,0	1897	Lazcano E.	3,0			
1857	Mena	8,2	1900	Lazcano E.	6,0			
	Benavente	23,6	1903	Lazcano E.	9,0			
1858	Benavente	24,0	1906	Sanfuentes	2,8			
1861	Benavente	27,0	1907	Escobar	4,4			
1862	Cerda	4,1	1909	Balmaceda F.	8,0			
1864	Larraín M.	9,0		Reyes P.	21,3			

Source: Author's creation from Valencia Avaria, Luis (comp.), *Anales de la República*, Vol. II.

Table 5. Senate Vice-President's previous congressional service

YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE	YEAR	VICE-PRESIDENT	SERVICE
1834	Elizondo	0	1869	Solar G.	2,6	1900	Blanco	3,10
	Echevers	0,4	1870	Solar G.	3,0	1901	Puga	3,9
1835	Barros F.	1,1	1873	Solar G.	6,0	1903	Puga	6,0
1837	Elizalde	3,0	1875	Prats	0	1905	Silva U.	8,5
1839	Barros F.	5,0	1876	Reyes C.	6,4	1906	Matte	6,0
1840	Barros F.	6,0	1879	Reyes C.	9,0	1908	Besa	5,2
1842	Egaña	8,0	1881	Ibáñez	5,1		Matte	8,5
1843	Egaña	9,0	1882	Ibáñez	6,0	1909	Besa	5,7
	Barros F.	9,0	1884	González	5,0		Villegas	3,0+6,0
1844	Egaña	10,0	1885	Sánchez F.	0		Matte	9,6
	Del Solar	7,1		González	6,6	1911	Devoto	5,2
1846	Barros F.	12,0	1886	Cuadra	4,0	1912	Letelier	0+4,9
1847	Errázuriz A.	1,1		Valderrama	1,1	1915	Letelier	3,0+4,9
	Barros F.	13,2		Lillo	1,7	1918	Barrios U.	0
	Benavente	13,6	1887	Valderrama	2,1		Feliú	3,4
1849	Errázuriz A.	3,0	1888	Vergara U.	3,0	1919	Besa	17,4
1851	Pinto	5,0		Cuevas	3,5	1920	Ovalle	5,0
1852	Pinto	6,0	1889	Cuevas	4,0	1921	Correa O.	9,0
1855	Pérez	3,0		Donoso	0,2	1924	Lyon	2,9
1857	Lazcano M.	5,2	1890	Silva A.	0,1		Arancibia	3,0
	Pérez	5,5	1891	Pereira	11,5			
1858	Pérez	6,0	1892	Amunátegui	3,3			
	Cerda	0,1		Zañartu	2,8			
1861	Cerda	3,0		Gandarillas	0,10			
1862	Mujica	7,1		Edwards R.	4,5			
1864	Torres	0	1893	Cuadra	10,7			
1866	Correa S.	20,2	1894	Lazcano E.	0			
1867	Correa S.	27,0	1896	Santelices	1,10			
	Alcalde	3,4+0,4	1897	Santelices	3,0			

Source: Author's creation from Valencia Avaria, Luis (comp.), *Anales de la República*, Vol. II.

Conclusions

This article pursued to find out about the historical development of Chilean congressional leadership offices, while contributing to theory-building by testing a key proposition of the theory of legislative institutionalization in the early Chilean legislature (1834-1924). This proposition maintains that legislatures gradually move toward greater boundedness by hardening their external boundaries, for which purpose the apprenticeship of Chilean congressional leaders is an operational indicator thereof drawn from mainstream literature.

The findings reported herein showed that rising to both houses' leadership offices did not require a long apprenticeship, due to their structural design and the growing impact of partisanship. Consequently, lateral entry, short office tenure, and returning leaders became conspicuous features in the House, though they were in shorter supply in the Senate.

However, a mild apprenticeship to rise to these offices became apparent after averaging the data by the relevant periods of Chilean political history. The average apprenticeship was always longer for a Presidency than for a Vice-Presidency in each house, even after the creation of the Second House Vice-Presidency in 1874. Likewise, the average apprenticeship was always longer for the First House Vice-Presidency than for the Second House Vice-Presidency. Moreover, the average apprenticeship was always longer for a Senate leadership office than for any House Vice-Presidency. All in all, these findings allowed inferring the existence of a ranking order among congressional leadership offices in both houses.

Interestingly enough, the average apprenticeship for the House Presidency ended up being the longest for all congressional leadership offices in both houses. In addition, the average apprenticeship for all House leadership offices behaved similarly over time, because it grew after 1861, notwithstanding a setback after 1891. On the contrary, the reverse was true for Senate leadership offices, as the average apprenticeship for the Senate Presidency and the Senate Vice-Presidency diverged after 1891; that is, whereas the Senate Presidency's constantly decreased after 1834, the Senate Vice-Presidency's went up after 1891. More likely than not, the explanations for these findings are, as follows: a) Political liberalization of the autocratic, Conservative Republic positively impacted on the average apprenticeship for House leadership offices, especially on the House Presidency, which strongly suggests that this office rose to some extent to prominence after 1861; on the contrary, it impacted negatively on the average apprenticeship for the Senate Presidency, which constantly decreased over time. b) Decreasing average apprenticeship for the Senate Presidency also might have been a life-cycle phenomenon, because former, senior or sophomore House members might have run for the Senate Presidency, once inducted into this house.

No doubt, these findings described a pattern of historical development of Chilean congressional leadership offices. First of all, lawmakers did not design them as powerful offices, but as majority-controlled offices inserted in a decentralized power structure, so that external influences made their way into their institutional design. Secondly, lateral entry, short office tenure, and returning leaders became conspicuous features of both houses' leadership offices, partly as a consequence of their institutional design. Thirdly, liberalization of the autocratic, Conservative Republic shaped the way these offices gradually evolved by rising to mild prominence the House Presidency, while decreasing the prominence of the Senate Presidency, which suggests a diverse impact of democratization on both houses' leadership. Fourthly, liberalization did not change the features of both houses' leadership offices in the long-run; rather, growing partisanship –a by-product of the development of the party system, fueled or qualified some of them during the Parliamentary Republic.

However, the findings provided mixed support for the theoretical assumption tested herein. Indeed, recruitment for congressional leadership offices came from without often; actually, it did not require a long apprenticeship. On the contrary, the length of the apprenticeship –as well as the persistence of congressional leadership, ebbed and flowed over time, even though it mildly “took-off” in the long-run. Nevertheless, the early Chilean legislature looked institutionalized by the early twentieth century⁴⁰, so the findings imply that legislative institutionalization takes different configurations depending on the institutional design and the exchanges between the legislature and the environment (especially the party system), all of which determine an upper limit for the institutionalization of a legislature⁴¹. As a matter of fact, the evidence showed that boundedness –a characteristic thereof, was in shorter supply in the early Chilean legislature than in Polsby's US. House of Representatives by the late 1960s, so the early Chilean legislature scored lower regarding boundedness in a hypothetical index of institutionalization. Therefore, the characteristics and operational indicators to measure legislative institutionalization vary in different polities and legislatures, which do not impair the grounds to consider a legislature as institutionalized, as long as it acquires stability, permanence, distinctiveness, and sustainability in a polity.

⁴⁰ Obando Camino, Iván Mauricio, *Legislative Institutionalization in Chile, 1834-1924*, unpublished manuscript, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, 2009, p. 405.

⁴¹ Hibbing, John, *Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them* /in/ *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 1999, p. 161.

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